Michel Yakovleff
Transcript (Translated)
Welcome. So we are going to talk about risk.
So... I don't know if you know the story of the Battle of Denain.
Denain is in the north. Are there any guys from the north here, from Chenor? OK. Next to Valenciennes. It's to say if... Well, it's a bit less in the middle of nowhere than Haute-Loire, but still. Well. Denain.
So, Denain, on July 24, 1713, near the end of Louis XIV's reign, a marshal named De Villars won a victory that saved France. And so that you understand just how much France was in deep trouble, it was the War of the Spanish Succession, which began in 1709, where basically, Europe... Was against France, Louis XIV, Europe, the coalition. And the coalition armies had thus invaded France starting in 1709 and, through successive sieges, had dismantled northern France, the French defensive system, one stronghold after another.
Is that good? Does everyone see?
And so...
Denain is on the ESCO.
Before Valenciennes. So let's say Denain is here, there's a bridge, Valenciennes is there.
And the coalition army was supported by the entire river network and the canals of the dark ESCO network in the north. And so their logistics arrived there and supported the coalition army. Which had gone to lay siege to Landrecies. Does Landrecies ring a bell? I've been there.
It wasn't much back then, and it's really not much today. Landrecies, I think they don't even have a Super-U, that's saying something. Well. But Landrecies had the particularity of being on the Oise River. And the logistics of armies at the time depended on rivers. It was on barges, because that allowed bringing tons. Prince Eugene's army, which I'm going to talk about, was... I'll mark them in red. It was 130,000 men. So, Prince Eugene.
130,000 men.
And the French army, under the orders of Villars, the old Marshal Villars, was 100,000.
The kingdom was exhausted. In 1712, I think, the coalition presented terms, peace conditions to Louis XIV. And in one of these conditions, he had to withdraw the Bourbon, his grandson, who had become King of Spain. The War of the Spanish Succession began because there was a disagreement over who would be king in Spain.
And Louis XIV had this very fine phrase. « If I have to wage war, I prefer to do it against my enemies rather than my children. »
But the country was bled dry after three years of war, of invasion, and the king did something that is... We've completely forgotten all that. He had a proclamation read at mass, I don't remember which day, there was a Sunday, where the entire kingdom of France heard the king's message. It's the first use of mass media.
And we're talking about mass media. 70% of the French population heard the message, the same day, at the same time. And in this message, the king explained to the people why he was continuing the war, why his cause was just, and why there would be, we would continue all these sacrifices. Because there were a lot of sacrifices. On top of that, there was a mini ice age. It was very cold. The winters were very harsh. Anyway, for the people, it was tough. It's something very new because it's the first time in the history of humanity that a sovereign, until then appointed by God, the Lord's anointing. The king is far from the Lord. Not far in the sense of eros. He is far, L apostrophe O I N T. He has the Lord's anointing. So he doesn't have to justify himself to the people. He is there by divine right. The king is there by divine right. The notion that he has to explain himself to the people is a silly idea.
France had reached such extremes that the king had this message written and read, explaining to the people why he would continue to ask for all their sacrifices.
It's a new conception of power that is born in France. A new conception of power. It's Louis XIV a few years before his death. 1715, he died. Well, how the war continues. It's to say if France was really close to dying as a state.
And so, in July 1713, Prince Eugene's army, which relies on the dark ESCO logistic system, lays siege to Landrecies, a small town of 6,000 inhabitants, if my memory serves, at the time, I don't know. And Landrecies...
has the particularity of being the last fortified place before Paris. After that, there's nothing left. And from Landrecies, one can create a new, much shorter logistic route that will bring the river convoys to Paris. That is to say, Landrecies is the lock to Paris.
Prince Eugene's armies, after two years of successive conquests, the Quai Noir which is here, fell, if I'm not mistaken, on July 13, after several months of very hard sieges, a lot of destruction, the Quai Noir suffered greatly. And so after the fall of the Quai Noir, only Valenciennes still holds, but the coalition doesn't need Valenciennes because their network arrives through there. And they plan to establish a new, shorter logistic line that will allow Prince Eugene's army to advance. So Landrecies is the lock of the kingdom. And to save the lock, Marshal Villars is brought out of semi-disgrace following the Battle of Malplaquet. And the king tells him, well, old man, your mission is simple, you have to save France.
Well. So, Villars.
Villars' problem is that with 100,000 against 130,000, it's usually bad news. It starts badly. So, the siege of Landrecies, that's it. What we call a circumvallation, that is, there is a line of entrenchment facing Landrecies. To give them a hard time, and a line facing the outside, facing a relief army, which is Villars' army. And we cover the interval, that makes 30 km. We cover the interval up to the logistic bridgehead which is Denain.
While setting up his siege, Villars offered battle to Prince Eugene at Le Cateau-Cambrésis, so on July 20. He advanced his army.
Hoping the other would attack him. That is to say, the position is good for him, there's a ridge, we dominate the area and all, we'll see him coming. Prince Eugene arrives and says, 'He really takes me for a six-week-old rabbit, that one.' So, he refuses the battle. Eugene has the leisure to refuse the battle since he is fighting for Andressi. If you want to challenge me, come and find me. You know where I am. Come whenever you want, comrade. Prince Eugene gave his name to a cruiser, the Prince Eugen, which sank at the same time as the Bismarck. They set out together, if that means anything to you. So in German history, Prince Eugene is someone important. He was an army general at the age of 28. And so, a master of fishing zigzags, a very, very good strategist, a very good general, etc. So, Prince Eugene is a good man. By the way, he had offered his services to the King of France at the beginning of his career. And the King of France had said, no, a 26-year-old upstart, I'm not going to recruit a 26-year-old upstart to command my armies. As a result, he went to the coalition, and then we saw him return with the coalition army, which is unfortunate. When you have talent like that, it's better to keep it at home. Well, anyway.
Well, so then... Villard has the problem that the other is going to push him into an offensive battle when he is at a disadvantage. And so, he devises a maneuver that will save France. So, on July 22-23, Villars' army does what they called the Great Uproar. So south of Andressie, they cross, the French cavalry, they cut a lot of wood because the sappers needed wood to make fascines, in short, materials for assaults, etc. And so they make a big racket there. And Prince Eugene observes this. He says, 'Well, the French, it's classic.' They are preparing for a battle to relieve Andressie, a battle they expect here or there. So Eugene has a corps of about 30,000 men to the north.
Which was roughly centered on the Black Quay, and he has it move down to tighten on the rest of the army. So in fact, Eugene, on the evening of the 23rd, is like this.
And then, it starts again. And that was what Villard wanted. During the night of the 23rd to the 24th, Villars' army disengages, as they say, moves north, covers 30 km on three axes, There is one in the Seille valley. Now, the Seille is a small stream that feeds the Escaut. And the road along the Seille is 6 km from Prince Eugene's lines. So the bridges are guarded, and hussars are on the ridge. Observing the fires of the Genoese army. And he sees, it's not moving. And the orders to move an army of 100,000 men with horses, artillery, and supply trains are total silence. You do not speak, etc. And all the supply trains, everything that makes noise, is on the westernmost axis. And so, during the night of the 23rd to the 24th, 100,000 men completely clear out from here and present themselves on the Escaut. The Escaut, at the time, was a marshy area, it's awful. The crossing takes place in the morning between 8 AM and noon. It takes 4 hours to cross the Escaut and especially the marshy area behind, so splosh, splosh, splosh, etc.
And in Denain itself, there are 6,000 men.
And the position was fortified, nothing more. And there, around 10 AM, Prince Eugene was still alerted. He comes to see what is happening. He observes the crossing in progress. Well.
And they tell him, so General, what do we do? He had a historic phrase, and what I say is true, he said, I think it's time to go to lunch.
It's true. In the sense, it was a way of saying, Villard is playing around there. He had not realized that it was his entire army that was there. But on returning to the tent where the soup was waiting for him, he says to himself, I think he got me. He got me, the bastard. And so, on returning, he takes the corps, the first corps he comes across, and says, 'Was it you who moved?' Well, yes. Well then, about-face, and no gymnastics until the Escaut.
As a result, he returns to where he can observe the scene. He returns, it's just a few horses, so it's not like an army that has to pack things up, make backpacks, and leave. And what he sees at noon is the first 40 battalions of Villars' army have crossed. Right face, right face. Guys, there are 40 battalions, so that's about 30,000 men, lined up in groups in the plain. Everyone kneels, the chaplains give the blessing, and suddenly, everyone stands up and in a great cry, they cover the 500 meters that separate them from Denain. There is intense musket fire waiting for them. In total, there will be 500 French dead and it is estimated about 3,000 Batavians. It was Batavians who were in Denain. That is to say, the guys barely had time to fire their muskets once or twice and the guys were on the position. And the capture of Denain takes place within the hour.
Meanwhile, the rest of the army crosses. And so, in the afternoon, the logistics are cut off. In the afternoon, Prince Eugene has his army corps make furious assaults. However, he cannot retake Denain. Because the bridge, of course, the army... Already, the bridge is broken because all the guys who... It's a wooden bridge, and the garrison of Denain... while fleeing, collapsed the bridge. And many soldiers died in the Escaut, drowned. So there is no longer a bridge. Here, there is a bridge called Prouvy. It happened once or twice and the regard was on the position. And the capture of Donin takes place within the hour.
Meanwhile, the rest of the army crosses. And so, in the afternoon, the logistics are cut off. In the afternoon, Prince Eugene has his army corps launch furious assaults. So, he cannot retake Denain. Because the bridge, necessarily, the army... Already, the bridge is broken, because all the guys who... It's a wooden bridge. And the garrison of Denain, while fleeing, collapsed the bridge. And many soldiers died in the river, drowned. So there is no longer a bridge. Here, there is a bridge called Prouvy. Nowadays, Prouvy is a commercial area. And the Prince of Tingry, who commands in Denain, had 15 battalions. He takes the 15 battalions in the afternoon on his own initiative and defends the bridge. So the bridge is attacked throughout the afternoon, and around 5 PM, the Prince of Tingry blows up the bridge. That way, it's over. And as a result, on the evening of July 24, the situation is completely reversed. Prince Eugene is besieging Landrecies, but he no longer has any logistics. He is cut off. The convoys, there was one per day. The convoy of the day was captured by the French. There are no other convoys. And reestablishing a logistics line there takes a week. During this week, his army is reduced to famine, and in particular, they eat the horses. Already, it's not done to eat your best friend, but when you eat the horses, afterward, you have many problems pulling the wagons and especially the artillery. And so, Prince Eugene's army, a week later, lifts the siege of Landrecies and retreats that way, abandoning most of its artillery and logistics. The Battle of Denain changed the course of French history. So between 1913 and 1914,
Villars retakes all of northern France, the strongholds fall one after another, and finally, he pursues Prince Eugene into the Black Forest, where the Peace of Rastatt will be signed, in 1714, I believe, which roughly set today's eastern borders of France, still defined by Rastatt. So Denain, in one day, changed the fate of the war.
So I was talking about risk, well, I'm supposed to talk to you about risk.
Here, Villars has 100,000 against 130,000.
And the guy was in a defensive position on the terrain he had chosen, having done what he had to do. Here, Villars had to find a solution to screw that bastard Prince Eugene. To put it politely, sorry. He had to find a solution. And it was a high-risk solution. Risk that the feint would not work. Risk especially that his army would be intercepted en route. Because that would have been possible. And at that moment, it was a battle at dawn, what is called a meeting engagement.
Risk during the crossing, he knew he was being observed by Eugene.
If he had left half of his army behind, Eugene could have devoured half of his army. And Denain would have been a small skirmish in a much more serious battle. Moreover, in the early morning, during the crossing, not in the early morning but at 9 or 10 AM, there was a big debate between Villars and his deputy, the Marquis de Montesquieu, because Villars had a moment of hesitation about having his entire army cross. He had not yet taken Denain.
And so, he had a moment of hesitation. I wonder if the guys who haven't crossed yet shouldn't form a hedgehog position facing south. And Montesquieu said to him, 'Oh no, Marshal, oh no, we started like this, so now we go all the way.' decide that we would cross the Scheldt, so there is no question of changing now. Now, we go.
Well, let's continue. And it was the right thing to do, because when Eugene found himself with his forces, not him alone with his spyglass, but with his forces ready to strike, he was expected by the other side, on the other side of the Scheldt, with a very marshy shitty area, all the bridges broken, that one broken, that one broken. And there, he had reversed Landrecies' proposition. It was, 'Ah, you, come get me, buddy, whenever you want, I'm waiting.' " with morale, the momentum of victory behind him. So here, I like this story, regardless of the fact that it saved France. Otherwise, I talk about Incheon, Korea, which is even more recent. But here, we have a guy who, by accepting a risk, chose his battle, which he won. And at the limit, he could only win. Because with his army of 100,000 men against 6,000, it was a matter of time. Once he was on the other side of the Scheldt, he was safe.
So he took a calculated risk. And there is this interesting aspect, it's that he was afraid of the risk taken in the morning. There was a moment when he was afraid. Because Villars, what I forgot to tell you, is that unlike Prince Eugene who was very audacious, Villars was a very cautious general. Very cautious, too cautious.
And that day, he surprised Eugene. Eugene said afterward that he had never thought that this old fox, as he called him, could pull such a cheeky move on him.
There you go. So why the risk, the taking of risk, here we see it,
Between 130,000 men and 100,000, statistically, it's not the 100,000 who win. And yet, here, they win, and decisively, historically. Why? Because the risk compensated for the difference. And likewise, if I am Ayrton Senna, well, he is dead, so maybe not the best example. Anyway.
Well, let's take a Senate. Senna with a car that has 20 fewer horsepower than Alain Prost, who therefore has 20 more horsepower. How is Senna going to beat Prost? He is going to take risks. He will brake later in the turns. He will accept being slipstreamed. He may not change tires when it rains. There is a trick. But for him to beat him... He will have to take risks. And so, in the end, if he ever wins, we can say that taking risks compensated for 20 horsepower difference in engine power, and more, since he won. So risk is part of combat potential. So I speak in military terms, you will judge for yourselves in business. Risk brings the taking of risk, the acceptance of risk. brings firepower. It is the equivalent of two artillery regiments, two squadrons of Rafales. It's, well, accepting risk makes me stronger.
And so, when I was younger,
and we were talking about... Anyway, regarding possible operations, there were the guys from the minister's office who looked at the thing and said, 'But there's a risk here.'
Yes, there's a risk. In any military operation, there's a risk. Otherwise, we wouldn't be in this line of work.
If I say, 'I go parachuting, there's a risk,' if you don't like risk, do something else. Play boules.
Or vacuum. You see what I mean? By definition, we do this job, we accept it.
And I was struck by the guys who said, 'We must minimize the risk.'
And me, the more I studied battles and everything, the more I told myself, 'No, wait, guys, the guys who win, or the guys who had every chance of winning but won cheaply, are the guys who took risks.' And so, instead of saying, 'We must control the risk in any maneuver you propose, take the one with the least risk,' no, no, no, we're going to completely reverse that. We're going to play at our highest level of risk, deliberately.
And I told my officers, when you design a maneuver, when we design a maneuver, it's about imagination, we design two courses of action, COA1 and COA2. They must be differentiated because we're going to compare them to see which one provides such an advantage, whether I'll arrive earlier at Donin, whether it will cost me less, etc. And there's the risk calculation, the risk assessment, we do it. So I told the guys, imagine course of action number 1, we're in the classic approach. Do the classic thing, don't overthink it, do as they say in the books, etc. And then number 2, before imagining it, you put a line of coke on the table, you do...
We're going to play it like that. With bloodshot eyes, drool coming out, etc. So COA1, COA2. At least they'll be different. And then we'll discuss the advantages and disadvantages. Now, we won't necessarily choose COA2, we're not all sick or cocaine addicts. But very often, we'll find interesting elements in this COA2 because they're destabilizing. For the adversary, I mean. And so, we'll choose a course of action that will be... Inspired by... Based on one, but with inspirations from the other. And above all, train people to imagine weird things, what I called the courses of action.
The exotic course of action. The French, they're like that. Oh yeah, but not him. That surprises the guy opposite. There you go. So, we must play at our highest level of risk and train at our highest level of risk. Because Villard, that morning, was scared because it was the first time in his life he was taking such a risk. He accepted it because it was that or France was dead.
There was a context for accepting that level of risk. But until then, he had never played at that level of risk.
He was overwhelmed by his own level of risk. And it went well. So he has a statue in Donin. If you go to Donin, well, Donin, nobody knows what Donin is. Anyway, when you go to Donin, you can't really say it's worth the detour, but well, there's a statue of Villard. But nobody knows why there's a Villard. What's he doing there? Anyway. He saved France. It's more important than the Marne, two centuries earlier. Well. So, in risk, when we study risk, there are, in the American authors I've read, three conceptual levels of risk, three degrees. There's moderate or limited risk, significant risk, and critical risk. Moderate risk is... Present your maneuver and all, I'm going to do it like this and all. Yeah, and if it doesn't go as planned, what happens? Well, I'll have to start over.
From the right instead of the left, two hours later. So, the risk is that it will take more time, It will cost me people, ammunition. There you go, we'll flounder a bit. That's the risk. Here, we're in limited risk. OK, well, if it doesn't go as planned, it's OK, it's fine, it's fine.
Like, the risk, if Ikea is closed, I'll go to Conforama.
Or the other way around. OK.
The risk, on the other hand, critical risk, what is it? And if it goes wrong? For example, here, if the feint doesn't work, if the army corps you saw coming there actually turned around during the night and Prince Eugene is waiting for you there, if ever he didn't swallow the story, if ever he didn't believe it, if ever he perceived something else, what happens? I get completely smashed. I'm dead.
Critical risk is when you engage the survival of the unit. An example of critical risk is at Bir Hakeim, when General Koenig made the sortie from Bir Hakeim. It's the Libyan campaign, Cyrenaica, 1942, if my memory serves, November 1942. And well, the Bir Hakeim garrison, 3,000 men, was encircled. There was no more water. There comes a time when, when you're in the desert without water, you have a real problem. So, it was either surrender, tomorrow or the day after, or the sortie. And Rommel himself was stunned that the French made a sortie. The sortie from Bir Hakeim, by the way, on a garrison of 3,000, allowed 1,700 to be saved. There are still 1,300 who were left behind.
We didn't save everyone. But we saved 1,700 men, the bulk of the garrison, under conditions—I won't go back into it—but under conditions that were, let's say, quite risky in terms of tactical risk. To get out at night, the garrison had to pass between two minefields under the noses of the Germans. It's stupid. When you march laterally, if the guys wake up, we're in trouble. So, it was a very high-risk sortie. And Rommel, the next day, when he learned that the French had left, he wrote to his wife. Back then, generals wrote to their wives.
So, it's in the notebooks of the general, Marshal Rommel. He wrote, the guys slipped away from me. I absolutely didn't believe it. He took me by surprise. He never imagined that General Koenig would take the risk of making a night sortie, abandoning his artillery under the nose of the force encircling him.
In the minefields. Well, so there you have it. So when you're in critical risk, when you're at that level, anyway, you're going to die. So you might as well go for it. But most of the time, the maneuver is in significant risk. And significant risk, so I said limited, critical, Significant. Significant is if your thing goes wrong, I fail. What do you mean, you fail? Oh right, you asked me to take Donat. If it goes wrong, I don't leave Donat.
I go on the defensive somewhere and then I wait. Someone else will do it for me. So when you say that to the army, I'm considering 'if it goes wrong, I won't complete my mission.' Then you have a real conceptual problem with your superior. The idea that we say 'I won't complete my mission' is strange. And so, it's not an option, as the Americans say. Failure is not an option. Yes. Except that what it means is when we say 'failure is not an option,' it means I present my action plan number 2, the cocaine addict, and I say, I want to go with this one. Oh yes, no, but if it doesn't work, what happens?
Well, failure. There you go. And that's it. I become defensive somewhere and then I wait. Someone else will do it for me. So, when you say that in the army, I consider 'if it's shit, I won't fulfill my mission.' There, you have a real conceptual problem with your superior. The idea that someone says 'I won't fulfill my mission' is strange. And so, it's not an option, as the Americans say. Failure is not an option. Yes. Except that what it means is, when we say 'failure is not an option,' it means I present my action plan number 2, the cocaine addict, and I say, I want to go with this one. Oh yes, no, but if it doesn't work, what happens? Well, failure. There you go. And that's it. When we say 'failure is not an option,' we tell the guy 'you don't accept that level of risk.' You only accept limited risk. And so we fight in a kind of swamp of small shitty risks that bring you nothing. Because why do we take the risk? It's not for a whim, it's not to establish intellectual superiority, etc. No, it's to win cheaply. At Denain, the French had 500 dead. Among the coalition, 3,000. It's cheaply paid for two armies that totaled 250,000. You see what I mean? We win a war cheaply. We're almost at zero deaths. It's clean, it's more beautiful than that. You die. So, in this case, well, yeah.
So, the significant risk, in fact, when we design this, we think,
by definition, if I want to be efficient, if I want to perform, if I want my system to play at the top of its game, it's by playing at the top of the risk I'm comfortable with. But becoming comfortable with risk is intellectual. So it's played out, it's practiced in exercises, in reading, in reasoned reading, as we used to say, and then in exercises with your men. Because your subordinates need to accept this level of risk. If they are timid, it won't work. And also, risk must be delegated to the lowest level. Everyone must take their share of risk. Because if everyone takes their share of risk, if everyone plays at their highest level of risk, at your level, you have less left, and so your failure will be less catastrophic, because it won't be the failure... Some will make it out. So, I won't go into the demonstration, but trying to distribute risk downward is, by the way, what banks do. I didn't dream it. Venture capital, unless I'm mistaken, seeks to disperse risk as low as possible.
So, accept playing at the highest level of risk. highest level of risk.
significant, blah blah blah, I'm just checking that I didn't... There we go, so, a few advantages. Risk. When you take risks, you have a much better chance of achieving surprise. You surprise the guy opposite because he didn't expect you to take that risk. And in particular, I'm talking about the military, I don't know about businesses, But Western armies, quite frankly, are not known for being accustomed to risk. That's not our reputation. We're rather timid.
And the word is polite. The military word is we're rather small dicks. It's really... Oh dear, we're going to take a risk. We're going to take a risk. Oh yeah! So we're going to take a risk, so we don't do it. But the result, when we say we're going to take a risk, but no, I want zero deaths, OK? The result is that I know how to do it with zero deaths. We do it with F-15s, B-1Bs, etc. And as a result, we cause a massacre on the other side. We have zero deaths. But on the other side, the number of weddings we've ruined because we weren't sure, you see what I mean, it's in Afghanistan, you're aware, and by the way, we're talking about it in Syria today. So what we call refusing risk is actually accepting a greater risk. Or making others bear it. At the limit, stay in control. In 1939, facing the German army that had gone to beat up the Poles, the French army had eight divisions facing it. And the French army was building up, but it had about 100. One can think that if the French had attacked in November 1939 in Germany, they might not have won the war and eliminated the Nazis, but they would have made a good showing, I think.
But they waited. As a result, in May, when the Germans attacked, we carried out a much higher-risk maneuver by putting everyone in Belgium. So because we refused the risk in the autumn of 1939, we had to accept a stupid risk in 1940. So if you wait to take risks, it's a risk. So don't wait, take all the risk you can and take it right away. Well, right away, without rushing, we think. But the sooner the better. The sooner I start, the better off I am. So to master risk, you have to assess risk. What range am I in? In the limited, in the significant? So in the significant, medium or serious? And above all, what does it bring me? Accepting this risk, what return do I expect from it? There comes a time when we'll hit diminishing returns, so I'll calm down. And above all, I train my people to understand and assess. and to become players. We all need to be players. Because players know how to calculate risk. Why don't I play the lottery? Because I'm not in the pooled mode. In the lottery, you don't risk winning, basically.
The chance of winning the lottery is almost zero. The state wins every time. But otherwise, there's a guy for every 2 million guys who have contributed. So for me, we're not in probabilistic calculation with the lottery. It's pure and simple donation. On the other hand, when you're at poker,
In poker, yes, that's where we're in the realm of reasonable probabilities. And there, good poker players, everyone knows it, I'm not a poker player, but everyone knows, they're the guys who take risks, who bluff, who cheat, etc. Well, anyway.
In war, you have the right to cheat. Not with the Geneva Conventions.
So, create surprise. We're going to create surprise.
Conceptually, there are always three degrees of surprise. Tactical surprise is when the guy was waiting for me there, and then I show up here. Oh really? Oh, that's stupid.
But we get out of it. OK, it's annoying, but I react. I turn left and that's it. Strategic surprise is when the guy had a plan and I broke his plan. For example, the French in 1940, when the Germans attacked, the French had... their plan to go into Belgium, the island plan, except that was exactly what the Germans wanted, so it was stupid. And so the French plan died on May 13th. They never recovered from it. They didn't have time to do anything else. There you go. So that's strategic surprise. And then there's what's called moral surprise, which is when, in addition, the desire to continue is dead. When you say to yourself, 'I've been so fooled that now...' So, if you play at the highest level of risk, you have a better chance of creating surprise. When you surprise the opponent, you deeply destabilize them. Just to say about surprise, it's often believed that surprise is... Yes, that was for me. It's my alarm clock.
It's often believed that surprise is fleeting, in the sense of 'before I was ignorant and now I know.' So there's no more surprise. Do you see what's there? Oh yes, right, the Germans crossed the Meuse. Well, now I know. Yes, except that the effect of surprise is all the time that elapses between the moment you know and the moment your countermeasures... Are effective. For example, Hitler was surprised by the Normandy landings. This surprise lasted until July 15, 1944, because on July 15, in 1944, the last reserve division of the 15th Army, which was in the Pas-de-Calais, was given to the 7th Army, which was in Normandy. Until then, for a month, Hitler wondered if it wasn't the secondary attack. So the effect of surprise can be quantified from June 6 to July 15.
After that, it's fine, the Germans understood. So surprise deeply destabilizes. And you don't achieve surprise without taking risks. There you go, I think that's my conclusion.
Which leaves you time for questions.